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Abstract
We consider a two-sided market model with a monopolistic Internet
Service Provider (ISP), network congestion sensitive content providers
(CPs), and Internet customers in order to study the impact of Quality-
of-Service (QoS) tiering on service innovation, broadband investments,
and welfare in comparison to network neutrality. We find that QoS
tiering is the more efficient regime in the short-run. However it does
not promote entry by new, congestion sensitive CPs, because the ISP
can expropriate much of the CPs' surplus. In the long-run, QoS tiering
may lead to more or less broadband capacity and welfare, depending on
the competition-elasticity of CPs' revenues.
1 Introduction
A decade after Lawrence Lessig (2001) first stated the principle of network
neutrality, the debate on this regulatory issue has developed many faces and
battlefields. Academics, practitioners, consumer rights groups and regula-
tors alike continue to be caught in the debate that centers around the idea
of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) exercising control over the data traffic
that flows through their networks. In this context, the meaning of 'con-
trol' is often ambiguous and can mean anything from blocking certain types
of undesired or unaffiliated traffic (Wu and Yoo, 2007), to termination fees
(Lee and Wu, 2009), to offering differentiated services and taking measures
of network management (Hahn and Wallsten, 2006). The most publicly vis-
ible part of the debate usually focuses on the relationship between ISPs and
end customers. Here, advocates of network neutrality fear that increasing
commercialization endangers the free and open spirit of the Internet that
has made it a success and governed free speech and the availability of legal
content (Lessig, 2001, 2002; Cerf, 2006). However, there seems to be little
disagreement over the fact that ISPs should not act as Internet gatekeepers
by preventing legal content from reaching consumers.
The most academically controversial part of the net neutrality debate is
the question of the future relationship between ISPs and content providers
(CPs). We seek to investigate in particular whether ISPs should be allowed
to offer CPs differentiated service classes for the transmission of their data
packets to end customersknown as Quality-of-Service (QoS) tiering (Lessig,
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2001, p.46; Hahn and Wallsten, 2006). Under a network neutrality regime,
the prioritization of paid-for traffic would be prohibited, even if QoS tiering
was offered on a non-discriminatory basis.1 This part of the debate is both
more relevant and more controversial with respect to potential consequences
for welfare and public policy (Sharma, 2010).
Proponents of network neutrality argue that only this regime can ensure a
level playing field for competition among content providers and will thus lead
to more content variety and service innovation (Lessig, 2001, p.168175; Wu,
2003; Van Schewick, 2006; Sydell, 2006). At a given transmission capacity,
the acceleration of priority traffic will lead unmistakably to a deceleration
of the remaining best-effort traffic. Thus, those CPs who are not willing
to pay for priority access are put at a disadvantage twice: first, from the
speeding up of other providers' content, and second, from the slowing down
of their own content. This disadvantage lies at the heart of the concern
of network neutrality proponents. Moreover, advocates claim that in the
long-run, broadband infrastructure investments are likely to be higher under
network neutrality, because ISPs are forced to maintain sufficient quality
of service in order to bring new content types on line and keep consumers
satisfied (Lessig, 2001, p.47). They even express the fear that QoS tiering
may in fact hinder the roll-out of additional transmission capacity, because
ISPs seek to charge CPs for exactly this resource, which is only possible if it
is scarce (Wu and Yoo, 2007).
Opponents of a network neutrality regime argue to the contrary that QoS
tiering will stimulate more service innovation and broadband investment. A
CP who offers an on-demand video streaming service, for example, is certainly
more sensitive to network congestion than a simple e-mail service provider.2
Consequently, they argue that the best-effort one-size-fits-all transmission
regime of a neutral network is not appropriate anymore (Yoo, 2005). If cus-
tomers' experience of use is unsatisfactory because a CP's service cannot be
reliably offered, this CP's online advertisement revenues will decline, possibly
1Here, 'non-discrimination' means that content providers can self-select whether they
want to buy priority treatment for their data packets or not. However, in the past network
providers have often discriminated data packets based on their content type. Examples
for such anti-competitive behavior are the blocking of voice-over-IP transmissions by mo-
bile network operators (Hahn et al., 2007) and the degradation of peer-to-peer traffic
(O'Connell, 2005).
2For expositional simplicity, in the following we will often use 'congestion' or 'speed' as
a proxy for different transmission quality measures, such as bandwidth, latency or jitter.
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up to the point where she is forced out of business (Crowcroft, 2007). Hence,
QoS tiering may in fact be welfare-enhancing, because it explicitly enables
entry and innovation by those CPs who crucially hinge on transmission qual-
ity requirements which the traditional neutral best-effort Internet may soon
be unable to provide. By contrast, net neutrality could hinder innovation,
because innovations can only occur if the corresponding CPs' business models
are also sustainable under the best-effort domain. Furthermore, supporters
of QoS tiering argue that investments in broadband infrastructure would
be higher under this regime because CPs can be billed for the transmission
quality they are using (Van Schewick, 2006; Yoo, 2005). Even if transmis-
sion capacity is not extended,3 QoS tiering might still be welfare-enhancing
because it avoids some of the the wasteful network capacity overprovisioning
by alleviating congestion for the most demanding content providers when
needed.
In light of the arguments for and against network neutrality regulation,
some observers have noted that the debate seems stuck in the sense that
at this point, it is impossible to foresee which architecture will ultimately
represent the best approach(Wu and Yoo, 2007).4 In an effort to advance
the debate, we provide a formal framework which incorporates the argu-
ments of either side. This allows us to compare QoS tiering with network
neutrality in terms of their impacts on service innovation, broadband in-
vestment and overall welfare. More specifically, we model the Internet as
a two-sided network (Armstrong, 2006; Rochet and Tirole, 2006) that con-
nects congestion-sensitive content providers with consumers, and which is
controlled by a monopolistic ISP.5 Under network neutrality regulation all
content providers experience the same transmission quality, whereas under
the QoS tiering regime, every content provider can choose to buy priority
access to consumers on the same non-discriminatory conditions. In addition
to the externalities that are generated by either side, we explicitly consider
the adverse effect that traffic prioritization has on the transmission quality of
the remaining best-effort class as well as the positive effect that congestion is
allocated away from the most congestion-sensitive content providers. In this
framework, we investigate the effects of QoS tiering both in the short-run,
3Crowcroft (2007), for example, suggests that QoS tiering is a zero sum game at any
instant.
4For a similar argument see Owen and Rosston (2006)
5In the context of network neutrality, the two-sided market framework was first sug-
gested by Sidak (2006a,b).
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when network capacity is fixed, as well as in the long-run, when the ISP can
strategically invest in broadband infrastructure.
Our main results are that in the short-run QoS tiering will lead to the
same level of entry and innovation by content providers as network neutrality.
However, because QoS tiering allocates congestion better to the congestion
insensitive CPs, overall short-run welfare is higher under this regime. Never-
theless, it should also be clear that QoS tiering enables ISPs to expropriate
some of the CPs' revenues and thus, in the short-run, all CPs are worse
off under QoS tiering than under network neutrality. Indeed, this fact has
driven much of the emotionality in the recent debate.6 Although the shift of
revenues from content providers to the ISP is welfare neutral per se, it will
generally still need to be scrutinized by policy makers in order to evaluate
the consequences.
Furthermore, our analysis reveals that the difference between the net neu-
trality and the QoS tiering regime with respect to investments and long-run
welfare will crucially depend on the elasticity of CPs' advertisement revenues
with respect to competition (i.e. an increase of active content providers in
the market). If CPs' ad revenues are elastic, the ISP has stronger incentives
to invest in infrastructure under network neutrality. In this case the private
investments are generally above the efficient level. On the other hand, if CPs'
advertisement revenues are inelastic, the ISP will invest more in broadband
infrastructure under QoS tiering, but then private investments are generally
below the efficient level. Thus, we find support for arguments on both sides
of the debate: when QoS tiering is socially preferred to net neutrality, ISPs
will invest too little in broadband infrastructure. When net neutrality is
preferred, ISPs are overproviding network capacity.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In Section 2 we
discuss our framework in the context of related work, before we formally
introduce the model in Section 3. Next, we investigate the differences be-
tween the QoS tiering and network neutrality regimes in the short-run with
respect to service innovation (Section 4), and in the long-run with respect
to broadband investments (Section 5). In Section 6 we consider the scope
6The debate was particularly stimulated after a blunt statement by Ed Whitacre, the
Chief Executive Officer of ATT, who said: Now what [content providers] would like to do
is use my pipes free, but I ain't going to let them do that because we have spent this capital
and we have to have a return on it (O'Connell, 2005). More recently, similar statements
have been released by major European network operators (Lambert, 2010; Schneibel and
Farivar, 2010).
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for regulatory intervention and comment on price regulation and minimum
quality standards. Finally, in Section 7 we briefly comment on the possibil-
ity of strategic quality degradation under QoS tiering before we conclude in
Section 8 by summarizing our results.
2 Related Work
Compared to the total number of academic papers that have been published
in the context of the net neutrality debate, the number of formal economic
papers within this domain is rather small. Schuett (2010) provides a recent
and comprehensive overview of this literature. The contributions that are
most related to ours are Cheng et al. (2010) and Choi and Kim (2010). Like
them, we investigate the ISP's incentive to invest in network infrastructure
under QoS tiering in a model that embodies standard results from queuing
theory to formalize the relationship between priority and best-effort traffic.
However, their model set-up differs from ours. The authors investigate the
effect of QoS tiering for two competing content providers that are located
at the end of a standard Hotelling line. It is assumed that customers dislike
congestion and visit one of the two content providers exclusively. However,
the content providers can improve their competitive position by purchasing
priority access from a monopolistic ISP. The hitch in Choi and Kim (2010) is
that the ISP will sell priority access to only one of the two content providers.
The authors make this unconventional assumption in order to exclude a possi-
ble prisoners' dilemma situation that is observed in Cheng et al. (2010), who
also allow the ISP to sell priority transmission to both content providers.
More precisely, Cheng et al. find that when the difference in profit margins
between the two content providers is rather small, both will individually buy
priority accessbut if both exercise this option, neither gains an advantage
and the price paid for priority access is forfeited.
Our model, on the contrary, considers a continuum of content providers
that is heterogeneous in their sensitivity towards congestion. Content
providers endogenously choose to join the network if their business model
is sustainable under the current congestion level. This allows us also to
study the effect of QoS tiering on entry and service innovation, which is not
possible in Cheng et al. (2010) and Choi and Kim (2010). In this respect, our
model is similar to that of Hermalin and Katz (2007), who, however, consider
a vertical differentiation model with endogenous entry of content providers.
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For Hermalin and Katz, QoS tiering means that the ISP offers a menu of
'qualities' from which content providers, who differ in their marginal willing-
ness to pay for quality, can choose. By contrast, under network neutrality
the ISP is allowed to offer only one quality. Unlike in our model, in Herma-
lin and Katz (2007) CPs' revenue elasticity is not considered. Furthermore,
the paper does not explicitly study investment incentives, nor considers the
adverse effect that the high priority class exerts on the remaining best-effort
class under fixed network capacity.
Economides and Tåg (2008), finally, consider a similar two-sided market
model. On one side of the market, there is a continuum of non-competing
content providers and, on the other side of the market, there is a continuum
of consumers. Each side experiences positive network externalities through
the presence of the other side. However, the authors do not consider a QoS
tiering regime and instead see a violation of network neutrality in the ISP's
practice of charging content providers a termination fee for access to its
customers.
While each of these models considers important facets of the net neutrality
debate, none has been capable of addressing all of the previously mentioned
aspects together. Thus, it is not surprising that previous results with respect
to innovation, investment and welfare are mixed: Hermalin and Katz (2007)
find that network neutrality leads to less innovation and has a tendency to
be welfare reducing. Choi and Kim (2010) and Cheng et al. (2010), on the
other hand, show for a large range of parameters, that the ISP's incentive
to invest in infrastructure is higher under network neutrality, whereas QoS
tiering is generally welfare-enhancing in the short-run. By taking a more
holistic approach that involves a two-sided market framework, queuing the-
ory, endogenous entry/innovation and infrastructure investments, we make
an attempt to provide a more complete picture of the differences between net-
work neutrality regulation and QoS tiering. In particular, we affirm that QoS
tiering is unambiguously welfare-enhancing in the short-run, while the long-
run welfare consequences depend on the content providers' advertisement
revenue elasticity with respect to an increase of active content providers in
the market. The ISP will invest more in broadband infrastructure under QoS
tiering if content providers' revenues are inelastic, but investments are still
below the efficient level. On the contrary, the ISP has stronger incentives
to invest in infrastructure under network neutrality if content provider's rev-
enues are elastic. However, in this case the private investments are likely to
be above the efficient level.
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3 The Model
We model the Internet as a two-sided market, with content providers and
Internet customers (ICs) on either side, each of which value an increasing
presence of the other side and dislike network congestion. In order to be able
to isolate the arguments of the net neutrality debate we abstract from the
full complexity of the networks forming the Internet and consider a single
monopolistic ISP providing access to consumers and content providers.
Content Providers We consider a continuum of CPs. Whatever service
the CPs offer, they provide it for free and receive revenues only indirectly
through online advertisements.7 In the model, a CP's advertisement rev-
enue will depend on the average received traffic, the per-click advertisement
revenue, and her individual click-through-rate, which is determined by the
CP's innate sensitivity towards network congestion. Before these measures
are formally introduced below, we make one fundamental assumption:
Assumption 1. Each content provider receives the same average traffic from
each customer, denoted by λ. This is independent of a content provider's
business model and consequently its innate sensitivity to network congestion.
For the remainder of this article, it will often be convenient to think of λ
as the number of 'clicks' that a customer generates on each content provider's
website. This assumption provides a neutral reference case, where customers
have no preference for specific content and rather distribute their clicks evenly
among the available content providers. On the content provider's end, usu-
ally only a fraction of these clicks can be turned into advertisement revenue.
This measure is known as the click-through rate. We assume that each CP's
click-through rate diminishes as network congestion increases. Moreover,
each CP's business model has an innate sensitivity as to what extent net-
work congestion affects the click-through rate. This individual congestion
sensitivity is denoted by θ and is uniformly distributed on the unit interval.
In summary, the individual click-through rate of CP x is
(1− θxw) (1)
7In particular, this means that we rule out the possibility that content providers charge
consumers directly for access to their content. However, this seems to be the more relevant
case as empirical evidence suggest that customers are generally fairly reluctant to pay extra
for specific content or services (Dou, 2004; Sydell, 2007).
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where w denotes the CP's perceived average level of network congestion.8 If
r is the average revenue-per-click on advertisements depending on the mass
of active content providers in the market, then each CPs' profit under net
neutrality is9
UNCP (θx) =
{(
1− θxwN
)
λη¯r if active
0 if inactive,
(2)
where η¯ denotes the share of Internet customers in equilibrium. Under net-
work neutrality all content providers perceive the same level of congestion,
wN . In the QoS tiering regime, however, content providers can opt for the
priority transmission class with wD1 < w
N at a price of pD per click. The
content providers that remain in the best-effort class, on the other hand,
experience a higher congestion level wD2 > w
N .
UDCP (θx) =

(
1− θxwD1
)
λη¯r − λη¯pD if active in priority class(
1− θxwD2
)
λη¯r if active in best-effort class
0 if inactive.
(3)
The CP that is indifferent between choosing the priority and the best-effort
transmission class under a QoS tiering regime, is denoted by θ˜D. Further-
more, in both regimes, the content provider that is indifferent between be-
coming active and staying out of the market is characterized by a congestion
sensitivity of θ¯. Recall that θ is normalized to the unit interval, such that
θ¯ also reflects the mass of all active content providers. Thus, the share of
content providers choosing the priority class under a QoS tiering regime is
given by
β ≡ 1− θ˜
D
θ¯D
. (4)
8Note that the click-through rate follows a Poisson thinning process. The thinning
probability depends on the average waiting time (w) as a proxy for congestion in a trans-
mission class and the sensitivity of the service (θ) itself. Therefore a CP with a high
innate sensitivity has a lower probability of making money than a CP with a low innate
sensitivity at any given congestion level.
9Throughout this paper, we distinguish between the network neutral regime and the
QoS tiering (differentiated services) regime by superscript N and D, respectively.
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In order to introduce competition among content providers in the model,
we assume that the level CPs' gross advertisement revenues depends on the
mass of active content providers, i.e. r(θ¯), and that ∂r(θ¯)
∂θ¯
≤ 0.
Finally, note the two-sided market property that Internet customers gen-
erate positive externalities on the CPs' profits.
Customers Likewise, Internet customers value basic connectedness to the
Internet as well as the presence of many content providers. In particular, we
assume that connectedness adds a base utility of b whereas each additional
content provider adds a marginal utility of v to a customer's utility.10 On the
other hand, customers dislike waiting for content due to network congestion.
This is captured through consumers' average waiting time, wˆ. To summarize,
a customer's utility is given by
UIC =
{
b+ vθ¯ − iwˆ − zη − a if connected
0 if not connected,
(5)
where i denotes a consumer's marginal opportunity costs in time (a proxy
for impatience), and a the access fee charged by the ISP.
As outlined before, in our analysis we intend to focus on the effect of QoS
tiering on the relationship between CPs and the ISP. Thus, for expositional
clarity we set z = 0, which makes customers homogeneous and allows the
ISP to extract all consumer surplus, but maintains the two-sided market
property (cf. Rochet and Tirole, 2006). In equilibrium the ISP therefore sets
the customer access price to11
a∗ = b+ vθ¯ − iwˆ. (6)
We assume that b is sufficiently large, such that all consumers connect to the
ISP in equilibrium, i.e.
η¯∗ = 1. (7)
10Recall that content providers are atomistic and customers have no preference for spe-
cific content. We therefore avoid making any judgment about the value of specific content
or service innovations to consumers. Instead we assume that consumers derive a utility of
v from every content provider entering the market.
11Now and in the following, an asterisk denotes equilibrium values.
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Network Congestion Network congestion is measured through the con-
sumers' average waiting time following a content request. We employ a
M/M/1 queuing model to fix ideas on the relationship between average wait-
ing time, network traffic and capacity.12 Under a network neutral regime the
M/M/1 model predicts that each consumer has an expected average waiting
time of
wN =
1
µ− Λ . (8)
Here µ represents the average rate at which service requests are handled,
which is interpreted as the overall transmission capacity ; whereas Λ denotes
the average rate at which customers' aggregate content requests arrive at the
ISP's network, which is interpreted as network traffic. More precisely,
Λ = η¯∗θ¯∗λ, (9)
i.e. network traffic will depend on the share of connected consumers, η¯, and
content providers, θ¯, in equilibrium, and the average traffic of each CP by
each customer, λ.13
Under a QoS regime, content providers are offered the choice between
a priority and a best-effort transmission class. In the M/M/1 model this
translates to introducing an additional queue which handles the request of
the content providers in the priority class and which is processed ahead of
the queue for the best-effort class. In this vein, the classical results of the
M/M/1 queuing model represent the average waiting time in the priority
class, wD1 , and the best-effort class, w
D
2 :
wD1 =
1
µ− βΛ (10)
12The M/M/1 queuing model assumes that (1) service requests arrive according to a
Poisson process (i.e. arrivals happen continuously and independently of one another), (2)
service time is exponentially distributed (i.e. request coming from a Poisson process are
handled at a constant average rate) and (3) that service requests are processed by a single
server. Furthermore it is assumed that the length of the queue as well as the number of
users is potentially infinite. This model is standard and considered to be a good proxy for
actual Internet congestion.
13In other words, Λ =
∫ η¯∗
y=0
∫ θ¯∗
x=0
λ dx dy. Moreover, because η¯∗ = 1, network traffic
reduces to Λ = θ¯∗λ in the following.
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wD2 =
µ
µ− Λw
D
1 (11)
It is easy to see that relation
wD1 < w
N < wD2 (12)
is always fulfilled, assuming a fixed transmission capacity µ and β < 1.14
This is an important feature of our model, because it shows formally that
serving some content providers with priority will (in the short-run) unam-
biguously lead to a degradation of service quality for the remaining content
providers in the best-effort class. These content providers are therefore put
at a disadvantage twice: first, through the prioritization of foreign traffic,
and second, through the degradation of their own traffic, compared to the
congestion level under network neutrality.
Moreover, notice that the customers' average waiting time is independent
of the introduction of service classes,15 because each customer will visit every
available content provider equally. Customers' requests to CPs in the priority
class will be processed within a time of wD1 , whereas requests to content
providers in the best-effort class take wD2 units of time. Consequently, the
average level of congestion in the network is
wˆ = βwD1 + (1− β)wD2 = wD1
(
µ− βΛ
µ− Λ
)
= wN , (13)
since wD1 =
1
µ−βΛ .
Internet Service Provider The ISP controls the two-sided market
through a number of variables which he sets strategically. First, he charges
an access fee, a, from connected consumers. Under a network neutral regime,
the consumer access fee is the only source of revenue for the ISP. Second, in
the long-run the ISP also sets the level of network capacity, µ. As outlined
before, customers and CPs dislike network congestion. The level of network
congestion is captured by customers' average waiting time for content, wˆ,
which is again controlled by the ISP through its choice of network capacity.
Hence, under a network neutrality regime, the ISP's profit is16
14For β = 1, when all content providers are in the first priority class, the model trivially
collapses to wD1 = w
N
15And also independent of β .
16Subscript s and l denote short-run and long-run incentives, respectively.
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ΠN = η¯∗a∗ − c(µ), (14)
where c(µ) denotes the costs of capacity expansion.17 Under a QoS tiering
regime, the ISP has an additional strategic variable, pD, the price which he
charges CPs to transmit data packets with priority. The ISP will choose
pD in order to maximize its additional revenues from selling priority access.
More precisely, under QoS tiering the ISP's profit function is
ΠD = η¯∗a∗ + βΛpD
∗ − c(µ). (15)
We consider the ISP's previous investment decisions into transmission ca-
pacity as sunk in all regimes. Therefore, in the short-run µ can be considered
an exogenous variable which is irrelevant for profit maximization.
4 Short-Run Effects on Innovation and Welfare
First, we compare the two network regimes in the short-run, i.e. when net-
work capacity, µ, is exogenous and equal in both regimes.
4.1 Short-run Equilibrium and Innovation
Network Neutrality Regime Recall that CPs are arranged on the unit
interval in order of ascending congestion sensitivity, θ. Those CPs with θ close
to zero offer a service with waiting time insensitive advertisement revenues,
whereas those with values of θ close to one are very sensitive to network
congestion. Under network neutrality all content providers expect the same
congestion level of wN and enter the network only if they have non-negative
utility at this level. Consequently, the last content provider to enter the
network is located at: 18
θ¯N
∗
=
µ
λ+ 1
(16)
17To ensure the existence of an interior solution to the ISP's investment decision, we
assume a non-concave cost function, i.e. ∂c∂µ ≥ 0 and ∂
2c
∂µ2 ≥ 0.
18We restrict our analysis to the interesting case where (at least) the most congestion
sensitive content provider, located at θ = 1, remains inactive in equilibrium. This is
ensured iff the average congestion level does not drop below wˆ > 1.
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It is immediately obvious that an increase in network traffic per content
provider, λ, has an adverse effect on network congestion and content variety.
∂wN
∂λ
> 0 and
∂θ¯N
∂λ
< 0
We label this the traffic effect, which is central to the debate on net-
work neutrality, because it exemplifies the network operators' concerns with
respect to the expected increase in traffic.
Next, recall that under a network neutral regime, the ISP makes profits
only by selling access to consumers. The optimal access charge and hence
ISP short-run profit is19
ΠN
∗
s = a
N∗ = b+ v
µ
λ+ 1
− iλ+ 1
µ
. (17)
Quality of Service Tiering Regime In the QoS tiering regime, the ISP
can alleviate congestion for the most congestion-sensitive content providers
through the provision of differentiated transmission classes. According to
(12), in the short-run, when transmission capacity is fixed, the remaining
providers will be handled in the best-effort class, but at higher congestion
levels than under network neutrality. We may now distinguish three types of
content providers:
1. CPs whose business model is relatively insensitive to network conges-
tion. They will remain in the free-of-charge best-effort class.
2. CPs whose business model is sufficiently sensitive to network conges-
tion. They will opt for priority access at a price of pD.
3. CPs whose business model is extremely sensitive to network congestion.
They will be foreclosed from market entry and remain inactive.
The content provider indifferent between the first two cases is denoted
by θ˜D, whereas the content provider indifferent between the last two cases
is denoted by θ¯D. Obviously, it must hold that 0 < θ˜D < θ¯D. Contrary
to Choi and Kim (2010), but similar to Hermalin and Katz (2007), in our
19Subscript 's' denotes short-run equilibria.
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model the 'high cost' content providers are more likely to opt for the priority
class. There are two reasons for this. First, we do not model the competitive
aspect of obtaining a larger market share based on the prioritized connection.
Second, in our model the incentive to buy priority is based on the individual
business model's innate need for a higher connection quality. In a fulfilled
expectations equilibrium, the marginal content providers are
θ¯D
∗
=
µ
λ+ 1
(18)
θ˜D
∗
=
p
λ(r(θ¯D∗)− p) θ¯
D∗ . (19)
It is easy to see that an increase in the price for priority transmission, pD,
will shift the indifferent CP downward, and therefore results in a larger share
of content providers in the priority class. Notice, however, that the share of
active content providers, θ¯D, is independent of pD. Furthermore, comparing
equation (18) with (16) directly reveals that
θ¯D
∗
s = θ¯
N∗
s =
1
wˆ
. (20)
This proves our first main result.
Proposition 1 (Innovation). In the short-run, QoS tiering has no effect on
innovation. The number of active content providers does not change, as com-
pared to network neutrality, independent of the price for priority access. In
both regimes the number of active content providers is inversely proportional
to the average level of congestion in the network.
This result has important implications for the network neutrality debate.
Under the present assumptions the claims of both parties are flawed in the
short-run: QoS tiering will lead to neither more nor less innovation. What
is even more surprising is the fact that the precise nature of the price for pri-
ority access is irrelevant. This is because under the realisticM/M/1 queuing
model, the benefit from congestion alleviation in the priority class and the
price for priority are held in checkat any price level. As will be seen below,
the last content provider to enter must pay exactly that amount for prior-
ity access which she has gained through extra advertisement revenues from
congestion alleviation.
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Furthermore, recall from equation (12) that QoS tiering does not affect
consumers' average waiting time. Thus, consumers' network utility is not
changed compared to the network neutrality regime, and consequently, the
ISP will charge the same amount for access in the short-run, independent of
the underlying assumption about network traffic:
aD
∗
s = a
N∗
s (21)
However, under a QoS tiering regime the ISP can additionally extract
rents from content providers through sales of priority access. In the short-
run, he will do so by maximizing ΛβpD, which is achieved through
pD
∗
=
(
1−
√
1
λ+ 1
)
r(θ¯D
∗
) =
(
1− w
D∗
1
wˆ
)
r(θ¯D
∗
) (22)
Intuitively, this shows that the ISP can extract a fraction of the content
providers' gross advertisement revenue r(θ¯D
∗
), depending on the congestion
alleviation to the priority class compared to the average congestion level in
the network. Furthermore, recall that the price has no influence on the num-
ber of active CPs under the M/M/1 specification and thus the equilibrium
price is independent of the customers' valuation for variety, v. Under the
QoS tiering regime, the ISP will make an extra profit of
∆ΠD ≡ ΠD − ΠN = ΛβpD∗ > 0 (23)
compared to the network neutrality regime.
Proposition 2 (ISP Preferred Regime). The ISP always prefers the QoS
tiering regime, because it can make extra profits by selling a priority trans-
mission service to content providers. Internet customers, however, pay the
same price for network access as under the network neutrality regime.
4.2 Short-Run Welfare Implications
Now we investigate the short-run effect of QoS tiering on welfare. Total
welfare,W , is the sum of Internet customers' surplus,WIC , content providers'
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surplus, WCP , and the ISP's profit, Π. Thus, the difference in social surplus
between QoS tiering and network neutrality is given by
∆W =
(
WDIC −WNIC
)
+
(
WDCP −WNCP
)
+ ∆ΠD (24)
Recall that Internet customers' surplus is zero under both regimes and
that ∆ΠD > 0 according to Proposition 2. What remains to be examined is
the short-run effect of QoS tiering on content providers' surplus.
[ENTER FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
To this extent, consider Figure 1 and notice that those content providers
located at θ ∈ [0, θ˜D) are evidently worse off under a QoS tiering regime,
because for them network congestion has increased from wN to wD2 . Second,
the content providers' welfare loss increases with congestion sensitivity on
the interval θ ∈ [0, θ˜D). The business model of the provider located at θ = 0
is not affected at all through congestion, while the provider at θ = θ˜D is
already suffering so much that she is indifferent between staying in the best-
effort class and buying priority access. Third, by the converse argument,
notice that the welfare loss decreases for those CPs in the priority class as
θ ∈ [θ˜D, θ¯N,D) increases. To see this, recall from Proposition 1 that the last
content provider to enter the market, θ¯N,D, is identical under both regimes
and receives a surplus of zero. For her, the benefit through reduced congestion
(compared to the network neutrality regime) is just offset by the price that
she pays for priority access. Consequently, for all content providers with less
congestion sensitivity, i.e. θ ∈ [θ˜D, θ¯N,D), the price that is paid for priority
is higher than the benefit of being in the priority class. Nevertheless, by
definition of θ˜D, for these providers the welfare loss is still less severe in the
first priority class than in the best-effort class. In this line of argumentation,
it is also obvious that content provider θ˜D incurs the greatest welfare loss. In
summary, we can conclude that in the short-run all active content providers
are (weakly) worse off under a QoS tiering regime.
However, the price that CPs pay for priority access is merely a welfare
shift to the ISP by a total of ∆ΠD (diagonally hatched area in Figure 1).
The sign of the overall welfare effect, ∆W , will therefore only depend on the
difference between the gross surplus gain through less congestion of those
content providers in the priority class and the gross surplus loss through
increased congestion of those providers remaining in the best-effort class.
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∆W = ∆ΠD +
(
WDCP −WNCP
)
=
(
θ¯ − θ˜
)
λpD −
∫ θ¯
θ=θ˜
λpDdθ +
λr(θ¯)
(∫ θ¯
0
(
1− wNθ) dθ − ∫ θ˜
0
(
1− wD2 θ
)
dθ −
∫ θ¯
θ˜
(
1− wD1 θ
)
dθ
)
= λr(θ¯)

(
wN − wD1
) ∫ θ¯
θ˜
θ dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
congestion alleviation
to priority class
− (wD2 − wN) ∫ θ˜
0
θ dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
congestion aggravation
to best-effort class
 (25)
Equation (25) reveals that the overall effect of QoS tiering on welfare
depends on the relative size of the congestion alleviation effect to providers
in the priority class versus the congestion aggravation effect to providers in
the best-effort class. These effects relate directly to the main argument of
proponents and opponents of net neutrality, respectively. Figure 2 exemplifies
the relative size of these effects. Net of the price paid for priority, which is
welfare neutral, content providers in the first priority class have higher surplus
than under network neutrality (vertically hatched area). In comparison, for
those content providers in the remaining best-effort class, some surplus is
destroyed (horizontally hatched area).
[ENTER FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Proposition 3 (Short-run Welfare). In the short-run, QoS tiering unam-
biguously increases welfare with respect to the network neutrality regime,
because congestion is alleviated for the most congestion sensitive content
providers in lieu of the less congestion sensitive content providers. How-
ever, all content providers are worse off under a QoS tiering regime because
the increased surplus is expropriated by the ISP.
QoS tiering will therefore always be welfare improving in the short-run,
because it 'allocates' congestion more efficiently. Those content providers
who are relatively inelastic to congestion with respect to their advertisement
revenues are allocated more congestion than the providers with relatively
congestion elastic advertisement revenues.
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5 Long-Run Effects on Broadband Investments
and Welfare
In this section we extend the analysis of the model to long-run investments
in network transmission capacity. Much of the neutrality debate is rooted in
the ISPs' concerns about infrastructure investments. On the one hand, ISPs
would like to accommodate new innovative content because this is valued by
customers. However, on the other hand ISPs disapprove of content providers
who free-ride on their infrastructure investments. QoS tiering seems to be
a plausible way out of this dilemma, but it is unclear whether this regime
will lead to more or less incentives for infrastructure investments than will
network neutrality regulation in the long-run. In our model, transmission
capacity is represented by the average service rate, µ, at which customer
requests can be handled. An increase of µ allows the ISP to handle more
service requests to content providers simultaneously.
5.1 Investment Incentives
Formally, the ISP's investment decision is a discrete decision stage which
precedes the previous analysis. The ISP chooses the network capacity level,
µ, first, and subsequently sets the customer access charge, a, and the prior-
ity price, pD, if applicable. In the subgame perfect long-run equilibrium, the
ISP will set the optimal capacity level at the point where the marginal rev-
enues of capacity expansion, MR ≡ ∂Πl
∂µ
, equal marginal costs MC ≡ ∂c(µ)
∂µ
.
Consequently, the ISP's optimal capacity level will be higher if marginal rev-
enues from capacity expansion are higher.20 In both network regimes the ISP
makes revenues from customer access. More precisely, we can distinguish the
following two marginal effects of capacity expansion on ISP revenue:
• The variety incentive
(
v ∂θ¯
∂µ
)
denotes the ISP's marginal revenue effect
from the entry of new, innovative content providers.
• The congestion incentive
(
−i∂wˆ
∂µ
)
describes the ISP's marginal revenue
effect from a change of the overall congestion level.
20Thereby we assume that the ISP's marginal revenues with respect to µ are decreasing,
while marginal costs are increasing. The former is shown in the appendix, whereas the
latter is warranted by the assumption of a convex cost function.
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Furthermore, notice that these investment incentives are always positive and
identical under both network regimes. Hence, potential differences in in-
vestments between the two regimes may only be a result of the additional
incentive that an ISP has under QoS tiering:
• The priority revenue incentive
(
∂∆ΠD
∂µ
)
denotes the ISP's marginal rev-
enue effect from selling priority access.
Consequently, the sign of the priority revenue incentive is definitive for the
comparison between investment incentives under QoS tiering and network
neutrality.
Proposition 4 (Investment Incentives). The ISP's optimal capacity level is
higher under QoS tiering if content providers' gross advertisement revenues
are inelastic with respect to an increase of active content providers in the
market (εr > −1). On the contrary, if the content providers' gross advertise-
ment revenues are elastic (εr < −1), the ISP has higher investment incentives
under network neutrality. At unit elasticity εr = −1 the ISP's investment
levels coincide under both regimes.
5.2 Innovation at the Edge and Long-Run Welfare
The ISP's investments into network infrastructure have direct ramifications
for welfare. At higher capacity levels customers enjoy lower network conges-
tion (congestion incentive) and the entry of new content providers (variety
incentive). Figure 3 illustrates the effect of capacity expansion for content
providers under QoS tiering. The reduction of network congestion increases
content providers' click-through rate and thus the slope of their surplus curve
in both transmission classes. The CPs in the best-effort class and also some
CPs in the first priority class may still be worse off than under network neu-
trality. However, as a consequence of the overall decreased congestion level,
both marginal content providers θ˜D and θ¯D are shifted to the right. This
means that new, congestion sensitive content providers are able to enter the
network. This is often termed 'innovation at the edge', because the services
of these content providers were not previously available. Obviously the sur-
plus of the new CPs (crosswise hatched area), but also the surplus of some of
the previously most congestion sensitive CPs (vertically hatched area), are
thus increased compared with a network neutrality regime.
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Accordingly, higher capacity levels will ceteris paribus lead to higher gross
utility for Internet customers and content providers.
QoS tiering will therefore be the efficient regime if CPs' ad revenues are
inelastic. In this case, QoS tiering leads to more welfare in the long-run
and, by Proposition 3, also in the short-run. However, a non-negligible share
of this surplus is immediately expropriated by the ISP. On the other hand,
if CPs' ad revenues are elastic, the network neutrality regime will provide
higher investment incentives. In this case, the choice of the socially preferred
network regime depends on the trade-off between long-run and short-run
welfare effects. While the QoS tiering regime increases welfare in the short-
run through better allocation of network congestion, network neutrality will
reduce the average congestion level in the long-run and thereby lead to more
innovation. The precise nature of the trade-off between the two regimes
depends on the costs of capacity expansion. It is likely, however, that in
this case network neutrality will eventually lead to higher overall welfare.
Proposition 5 summarizes the results.
Proposition 5 (Long-Run Welfare). The regime that provides more incen-
tives for infrastructure investments is more efficient in the long-run. If in-
vestment incentives are higher under network neutrality, the long-run welfare
gain must be weighed against the short-run welfare loss compared to QoS tier-
ing.
If QoS tiering provides more investment incentives, it is unambiguously the
more efficient regime. However, in this case the ISP is able to expropriate
much of the content providers' surplus through the price for priority trans-
mission. Nevertheless, the most congestion sensitive content providers will
be better off than under network neutrality.
6 Regulatory Implications
We conclude our analysis with an investigation of the suitability of two promi-
nent policy instruments in this domain: price regulation and minimum qual-
ity standards. Price regulation seems to be a promising policy tool with
respect to controlling the ISP's expropriation of content providers' surplus,
and is thus targeted at short-term regulation. On the other hand, minimum
quality standards are targeted at infrastructure regulation and have recently
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been proposed to mitigate the congestion aggravation effect to the content
providers in the best-effort class under QoS tiering.
6.1 Price Regulation
Although QoS tiering is the more efficient regime in the short-run, policy
makers may be suspicious of the fact that much of the social surplus is ac-
commodated by the ISP. It seems logical at first to regulate the revenue
stream between content providers and the ISP through price controls. The
regulated price should thus be set to maximize the social surplus under QoS
tiering,WD. In particular, the social planner's and ISP's maximization prob-
lems differ by the term
WD − ΠD = wˆ − w
D
1 (p)
wˆ wD1 (p)
. (26)
In other words, the social planner seeks to set the regulated price such that
the optimal share of content providers selects the priority transmission class.
In this vein content providers' gross surplus is maximized. However, the ISP
pursues the same goal, because he can subsequently extract a fraction of this
surplus.
Proposition 6 (Price Regulation). A welfare maximizing social planner
would select the same price for priority transmission as the revenue maxi-
mizing ISP. Therefore, regulating the price below the ISP's price level will
inevitably lead to welfare reductions.
To provide further intuition for this result, assume that a regulatory
agency would lower the price for prioritized traffic under the level which
the ISP has chosen according to (22). Consequently, more content providers
would subscribe to the priority transmission service,21 and in turn increase
the average waiting time in the priority class. However, because the priority
traffic is handled before the best-effort traffic, congestion is also increased for
content providers in the remaining best-effort class. Nevertheless, the aver-
age congestion level remains unchanged because the content providers that
have switched to the priority class experience a lower congestion level than
before. But overall, content providers' gross surplus is reduced. Of course,
21Remember that a price reduction does not result in the entry or exit of content
providers.
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price regulation would indeed also shift some of the surplus back from the ISP
to the content providers. Unfortunately, this effort proportionally destroys
welfare, as long as the ISP's and CPs' surplus are not considered different.
In the most extreme case, regulation could impose a zero-pricing-rule which
would in fact reestablish the network neutrality regime.
6.2 Infrastructure Regulation
Price controls are not a suitable policy instrument to correct for potential
welfare distortions, because in the short-run social and private incentives
are in line. This is generally not true for the ISP's long-run incentives to
invest in infrastructure. Opponents of net neutrality regulation have often
objected that this regime forces ISPs to invest above the efficient level, which
is known as overprovisioning. On the contrary, opponents of QoS tiering ar-
gue that this regime induces ISPs to keep transmission capacity scarce, and
thus broadband investments are generally below the efficient level (under-
provisioning). We can show that the difference between the efficient and pri-
vate level of infrastructure investments is in fact independent of the network
regime, but depends again on the elasticity of content providers' revenues.
Proposition 7 (Infrastructure Regulation). The social planner has a higher
incentive to invest in network capacity than the ISP, if content providers'
gross advertisement revenues are inelastic with respect to an increase of ac-
tive content providers in the market (εr > −1). On the contrary, if content
providers' ad revenues are elastic (εr < −1), the ISP provides network ca-
pacity above the efficient level. This result holds for both network regimes,
QoS tiering and network neutrality.
The wit of Proposition 7 is that the arguments of either side are to some
extent right. When network neutrality provides higher investment incentives
(εr < −1), and is thus more efficient in the long-run, the ISP will invest too
much in network infrastructure (overprovisioning). On the other hand, if QoS
tiering is the socially preferred regime (εr > −1), private investments will
be too low (underprovisioning). Especially in the latter case, policy makers
are faced with a dilemma. Even though QoS tiering is the socially preferred
regime, the ISP is able to expropriate much of the social surplus and private
investments are still below the efficient level. Clearly, additional efforts to
subsidize the ISP's broadband investments are not politically feasible and
thus alternative policy instruments must be considered.
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Minimum Quality Standards It has recently been argued that a mini-
mum quality standard (MQS) could be an appropriate policy instrument in
this context (Brennan, 2010). After all, MQSs have found to be generally
welfare-enhancing in competitive settings (Ronnen, 1991). For example, here
the MQS could be set such that the ISP is required to offer content providers
under QoS tiering a congestion level in the best-effort class that is as least as
low as the equilibrium best-effort congestion level under network neutrality.
Consequently, under the QoS tiering regime no content provider would be
set at a disadvantage anymore. Moreover, in order to meet the MQS, the
ISP is required to increase the network's capacity, potentially to the extent
that the gap between the level of private and efficient investments is closed.
More precisely, by requiring the MQS wN(µN
∗
) ≡ wD2 (µMQS) the regulator
implicitly defines the new capacity level µMQS > µN
∗
.
First, consider the case where εr < −1. By Proposition 4 we know
that the ISP's former privately optimal capacity level yields µD
∗
< µN
∗
.
Moreover, by Proposition 7 it is known that the equilibrium capacity is above
the efficient level, µD
∗
> µD
∗∗
. Taken together, it follows that
µMQS > µN
∗
> µD
∗
> µD
∗∗
.
Consequently, in this case the imposed MQS would lead to a further increase
of the ISP's already excessive network capacity, well above the efficient level
µD
∗∗
.
Now assume εr > −1. Here the order of relevant capacity levels is
µD
∗∗
> µD
∗
> µN
∗
.
Remember that µMQS > µN
∗
, and thus we can differentiate between three
different cases. First, if µD
∗ ≥ µMQS, the MQS is not a binding condition for
the ISP's capacity choice an hence is simply ineffective. Second, if µD
∗∗ ≥
µMQS > µD
∗
the MQS is effective in raising the ISP's network capacity level,
potentially up to the efficient level. Third, if µMQS > µD
∗∗
the MQS policy
may again lead to an excessive investment in network infrastructure.
In summary, MQS are only effective in one out of three cases when content
providers' ad revenues are inelastic, and never when ad revenues are elastic.
Proposition 8 (Minimum Quality Standard Regulation). An MQS policy,
which requires the ISP to guarantee a best-effort congestion level under QoS
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tiering which is equal to the equilibrium congestion level under network neu-
trality, results in excessive infrastructure investments when content providers'
revenues are elastic. When content providers' revenues are inelastic, QoS
tiering will already lead to more infrastructure investments than network neu-
trality. An additional MQS policy may still increase welfare, but may also
lead to excessive investments or be ineffective.
7 Strategic Quality Degradation
In the preceding analysis we have neglected the possibility that the monop-
olistic ISP may also engage in non-price discrimination, for example by de-
grading the quality of the best-effort class under QoS tiering. The concern for
strategic quality degradation under a QoS tiering regime has been expressed
by network neutrality proponents, but also previous empirical and theoreti-
cal research has identified several circumstances under which such practice is
indeed profitable (Economides, 1998; Foros et al., 2002; Crawford and Shum,
2007). Absent the possibility to degrade the quality of the best-effort class,
the ISP's only control over the share of CPs that buy priority transmission
in equilibrium (β) is through the price pD. In this case, as has been shown in
Section 6, the ISP will choose the efficient price which maximizes CPs' gross
surplus. Quality degradation, however, provides the ISP with an additional
means through which it can manipulate the relative attractiveness of the
priority class over the best-effort class and thus the mass of CPs that buy
priority transmission in equilibrium. It is inevitable that such practice will
destroy some CPs' surplus and therefore questions the previously positive
welfare results of QoS tiering. However, ex-ante it is not clear whether there
exist scenarios under which quality degradation may actually be profitable
to the ISP in the first place.
To this end, consider the extreme scenario where the ISP degrades the
best-effort class under a QoS tiering regime maximally (wd2 → ∞), such
that in equilibrium no content provider wants to remain in the best-effort
class (θ˜d
∗ → 0, βd∗ → 1).22 Furthermore, let r(θ) = r be constant in this
example.23 We will show that there exist circumstances under which even
22Superscript `d' denotes the QoS tiering regime with maximum quality degradation.
23This does not affect the generality of the existence of settings in which the ISP prefers
to degrade the best-effort class under QoS tiering. In fact, as will be readily seen later,
assuming r to be constant, is the most conservative assumption one can make in this
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this extreme form of quality degradation is profitable. More precisely, by
rendering the best-effort class useless, the ISP effectively forces all content
providers into the priority transmission class. It is easy to see that this is
equivalent to a scenario in which the ISP demands a termination fee from
each content provider for transmitting content to its connected consumers.24
At a fixed transmission capacity, this has detrimental effects on innovation
and welfare.
To see this, recall that without quality degradation, the last content
provider to enter the network was located at θ
D,N
= 1
wˆ
, independent of
the network regime and independent of the price for priority transmission.
In contrast, the last content provider to enter under quality degradation is
located at
θ
d
=
1− pd
r
wd1
. (27)
Since all content providers are forced into the priority transmission class,
congestion is the same for all content providers and at a similar level than
under network neutrality. Thus, maximum quality degradation not only de-
stroys the source of the positive welfare effects of the QoS tiering regime, but
also forces the most congestion sensitive content providers out of the net-
work: CPs experience a similar congestion level as under network neutrality,
but have to pay a price pd > 0 as if they were under QoS tiering. While
under the M/M/1 queuing assumption, the congestion alleviation and the
price for priority were held in check, such that the level of innovation was in
fact independent of the price level, this is no longer true under quality degra-
dation. The higher the price for priority, the less content providers will enter
the network. To be precise, it must be mentioned that the smaller mass of
active content providers will also slightly reduce the average congestion level
compared to network neutrality or QoS tiering, i.e. wd1 < wˆ. However, this
type of congestion alleviation effect cannot outweigh the detrimental effect
to innovation and welfare.
context.
24Consequently the analysis in this section bridges the gap between the formal strand
of the literature that considers net neutrality as a zero-price rule (i.e. no termination fees)
and the literature that associates net neutrality with a non-discrimination rule (see. cf.
Schuett, 2010).
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Proposition 9 (Innovation and Welfare under Quality Degradation). When
the ISP degrades the quality of the best-effort class under QoS tiering such
that all content providers choose to buy priority transmission, then, compared
to network neutrality, less content providers enter the network in equilibrium
and overall welfare is lower.
Consequently, quality degradation is undesirable from a policy perspec-
tive and tarnishes the short-run welfare results of QoS tiering. The question
remains, however, whether quality degradation is in fact a profitable option
to the ISP under QoS tiering and thus constitutes an actual source of concern
to policy makers.
The effect of quality degradation on the ISP's revenue depends on the
trade-off of two opposing effects. By Proposition 9 quality degradation results
in less content variety and consequently the ISP can charge consumers less for
access. On the other hand, quality degradation forces all content providers
to pay for their traffic and thus revenues from priority sales are potentially
larger than before. Obviously, this trade-off is driven by the relative size
of the marginal valuations of consumers and content providers, respectively.
This can be exemplified by the equilibrium price formula:
pd
∗
=
r(1 + λ)−√r (v + r(1 + λ))
λ
. (28)
First notice that pd depends on v, as one would expect from a two-sided
market model, because the ISP takes into account the reduction in variety
that would result from an increase of the price.25 Prices are positive as
long as v < rλ(1 + λ), i.e. as long as the consumers' marginal utility for
variety is not too large with respect to the CPs' marginal valuation for gross
traffic (generated by consumers). On the contrary, if v > rλ(1 + λ), the ISP
would theoretically like to subsidize the content providers and thus promote
innovation in order to extract consumers' high utility from variety.
Proposition 10 (Profitability of Quality Degradation). For all v < v, where
v < rλ(1+λ),∀λ > 0, the ISP makes larger profits under a QoS tiering regime
in which the transmission quality of the best-effort class is degraded, such that
all content providers choose to buy priority transmission in comparison to a
QoS tiering regime without quality degradation.
25Recall that under theM/M/1 specification the price was irrelevant for innovation and
thus v did not enter the pricing formula.
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Proposition 10 establishes first that the ISP never subsidizes content
providers by imposing negative prices under maximum quality degradation,
but rather prefers to refrain from quality degradation and revert to the un-
tempered QoS tiering regime instead. This also implies that the ISP will not
privately establish a network neutrality regime, which could be the result of
QoS tiering with maximum quality degradation and a price of pd = 0. Sec-
ondly, and more importantly, the proposition highlights that strategic quality
degradation is in fact a profitable strategy for the ISP as long as consumers'
marginal valuation for variety is sufficiently small.26
Given the detrimental welfare consequences of quality degradation under
a QoS tiering regime, policy makers should be aware of this strategic option.
In particular, if policy makers suspect the ISP to engage in quality degra-
dation, some of the previously reviewed policy instruments may now regain
attention. As mentioned before, price regulation (i.e. pd = 0) can at least en-
sure the current status quo of the network neutrality regime. However, such
regulation also excludes the potentially positive welfare effects of an untem-
pered QoS tiering regime. In this context, minimum quality standards and
transparency obligations seem to provide a more appropriate policy tool. If
applied effectively, such obligations can preclude the ISP's negative strategic
incentives under QoS tiering, while maintaining the generally positive wel-
fare effects of this regime; after all, the ISP is still left better off than under
network neutrality.
8 Conclusions
Network neutrality has become a prime topic for many regulatory authorities,
but the effect of such regulation is still unclear. Scholarly papers often find
contradictory results with respect to the consequences of network neutrality
on service innovation, broadband investments and welfare. We contribute to
the ongoing debate on network neutrality by providing a formal framework
that incorporates the relevant arguments of net neutrality proponents and
opponents in a two-sided market framework with Internet customers, con-
tent providers and an Internet service provider. Our analysis focuses on the
26If instead we would have assumed again that ∂r(θ¯)
∂θ¯
< 0, then the profitability of
quality degradation would even be increased. This is because the aggregate loss in CPs'
gross advertisement revenues that is caused by the reduction in content variety according
to Proposition 9, would be less pronounced.
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relationship between content providers and the ISP, and compares network
neutrality to a Quality-of-Service tiering regime, in which content providers
may pay for the prioritized transmission of their data packets. We explicitly
consider the negative externality that prioritization has on the remaining
best-effort class, but acknowledge that content providers' services differ in
their sensitivity toward network congestion, and may offer their services only
if they are sustainable under the given congestion level.
We find that QoS tiering increases welfare in the short-run because the in-
stalled level of network capacity is used more efficiently. Network congestion
is alleviated for the most congestion sensitive content providers and this effect
offsets the congestion aggravation for the content providers in the remaining
best-effort class. However, QoS tiering does not immediately promote the
entry of new content provides with innovative services that are even more
congestion sensitive. In fact, in the short-run, all content providers are worse
off under a QoS tiering regime, because the ISP is able to expropriate some
of the content providers' surplus through priority pricing. Consequently, the
ISP always prefers the QoS tiering regime. It is subject to the authority of
policy makers to evaluate the shift of surplus from content providers to ISPs,
which is welfare neutral per se, but lies at the heart of the net neutrality
debate. On the one hand, those content providers with intermediate conges-
tion sensitivity (who are indifferent between buying priority and remaining
in the best-effort class) will especially suffer from a switch to QoS tiering.
On the other hand, ISPs argue that they will use the additional revenues to
invest more in broadband infrastructure. We show that this is only true if
competition among content providers is weak, i.e. if content providers' gross
advertisement revenues are inelastic with respect to an increase of active con-
tent providers in the market. In this case, the ISP will indeed invest more in
broadband infrastructure than under network neutrality. On the contrary,
if competition among content providers is strong (gross advertisement rev-
enues are elastic), network neutrality regulation will eventually lead to more
private infrastructure investments.
Accordingly, QoS tiering is unambiguously the more efficient regime when
content providers' revenues are inelastic: the ISP invests more into broad-
band infrastructure, lowers the overall congestion level in the long-run and
thereby encourages entry of new content providers with highly congestion sen-
sitive services. The most congestion sensitive content providers will therefore
be better off under QoS tiering, and hence it is not surprising that Google
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and Verizon have privately agreed on a tiered system (Wyatt, 2010).27 How-
ever, when content providers' revenues are elastic, investment incentives are
higher under network neutrality. In this case the long-term efficiency gains
of net neutrality must be weighed against its short-term inefficiencies.
Furthermore, our analysis reveals that the level of private investments
is generally not efficient. When network neutrality is the socially preferred
regime, investments are too high (overprovisioning), whereas investments are
too low (underprovisioning) when QoS tiering is the more efficient regime. In
this sense, our analysis unifies both sides of the debate, but presents policy
makers with a dilemma; and we show that there is no 'easy way' out of this
dilemma: although price regulation can shift some of the congestion allevia-
tion gains back to content providers, it is unsuitable as a policy instrument,
because welfare is proportionally destroyed in the process. Therefore, if reg-
ulatory correction is desired, it should address the regulation of broadband
infrastructure more directly. Certainly, in the light of the ISP's additional
revenues under QoS tiering, it seems politically impossible to further subsi-
dize the ISP's infrastructure investments. Minimum quality standards have
recently been proposed as a more appropriate policy instrument. However,
we show that a policy that requires the ISP to guarantee a congestion level in
the best-effort class under QoS tiering which is at least as good as the best-
effort congestion level under network neutrality is likely to induce excessive
broadband investments. Yet future research is needed to find more pertinent
ways to regulate broadband infrastructure. One promising possibility that
we have not addressed here is to mitigate quality degradation and to stim-
ulate broadband investments through the infrastructure-based competition
among ISPs. This, however, is subject to the perennial effort of regulatory
authorities.
The caveat is that the previous results hold only as long as the ISP has no
incentive to strategically degrade the quality of the best-effort class. Strategic
quality degradation is detrimental to innovation and welfare, but leaves the
ISP with higher profits if consumers' marginal utility for content variety is
small. It can possibly be counteracted, however, by Internet transparency
obligations, or by setting a minimum quality standard for the best-effort
class. In the latter case, our results advise that the minimum standard
27Interestingly, Google CEO Eric Schmidt argues that such an agreement would be in
line with net neutrality, because it does not discriminate against specific content providers
(Fehrenbacher, 2010).
29
should not be set too high (i.e. not necessarily at the congestion level of the
best-effort class under network neutrality), but for instance at a congestion
level that would have emerged for the best-effort class in an untempered QoS
tiering regime. With respect to transparency obligations, it is noticeable that
FCC chairman Julius Genachowski has recently proposed the amendment of
such a new principle for Internet policytogether with an accompanying non-
discrimination principle (Genachowski, 2009). While we find strong support
for the transparency principle, the non-discrimination principle, on the other
hand, can potentially be harmful if it prevents ISPs from offering QoS tiering
on a non-discriminatory basis.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof.
∆ΠD = ΛβpD
∗
= µr(θ¯D
∗
)
(
1 +
1
1 + λ
− 2√
1 + λ
)
,
which is always greater than zero for µ, r(θ¯D
∗
), λ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. From (25) it is clear that
∆W =
λr(θ¯)
2
((
wN − wD1
) (
θ¯2 − θ˜2
)
− (wD2 − wN) θ˜2) .
Thus,
∆W > 0⇔ w
N − wD1
wD2 − wN
>
θ˜2
θ¯2 − θ˜2 ⇔
1− β
β
>
(1− β)2
1− (1− β)2 ⇔ 0 < β < 1
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Incentives to invest into network capacity are higher under QoS
tiering iff marginal revenues from priority sales are greater than zero,
provided that the ISP revenues are concave, and the costs of capacity
expansion convex in µ. The latter is warranted by assumption. To ensure
that the ISP's revenues are concave the property ∂
2ΠD
∂µ2
≤ 0 has to be fulfilled.
It is easy to verify, that this is always true, if ad-revenues are constant or
concave and monotonic decreasing. If ad-revenues are convex and monotonic
decreasing, consider the following derivative.
∂2ΠD
∂µ2
= −i (1 + λ)
µ3
+
[
∂2r(θ¯)
∂θ¯2
θ¯
2
+
∂r(θ¯)
∂θ¯
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
∂θ¯
µ
(
1 +
1
(1 + λ)
− 2√
1 + λ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
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Since B ≥ 0 always holds, the ISP revenues are concave if
∂2ΠD
∂µ2
≤ 0
{
A ≤ 0 always
A > 0 if i(1+λ)
2
µ3B
≥ A
Therefore we have to assume, that the condition in the second case holds.
Now consider ∆ΠD from (23). Differentiating with respect to µ yields
∂∆ΠD
∂µ
=
√
λ+ 1
(
(λ+ 1)−√λ+ 1)
(λ+ 1)
√
λ+ 1
[
∂r(θ¯D)
∂θ¯D
∂θ¯D
∂µ
µ+ r(θ¯D)
]
The sign of the derivative is determined by the part in square brackets.
Consequently,
∂∆ΠD
∂µ
S 0 ⇔ εr = ∂r(θ¯
D)
∂θ¯
θ¯
r(θ¯D)
S −1
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. To see that the overall congestion level, wˆ decreases with capacity
expansion, we show that ∂wˆ
∂µ
=
∂ 1
µ−Λ
∂µ
< 0: Notice that Λ = θ¯∗λ = λµ
λ+1
, so
that ∂Λ
∂µ
= λ
λ+1
< 1. Therefore, it holds that ∂(µ−Λ)
∂µ
> 0 and consequently,
∂ 1
µ−Λ
∂µ
< 0. By equation (3) and (5) it is immediately obvious that the gross
utility of customers and content providers increases as the congestion level
decreases. The homogeneity of customers allows the ISP to fully expropriate
the additional customer utility. Capacity expansion also increases the amount
of active content providers, since ∂θ¯
∂µ
> 0 by equation (18). Before the capacity
expansion occurred, these content providers had a surplus of zero and are
therefore unambiguously better off.
Additionally some content providers already active in the market are better
off. To determine the critical content provider one has to solve the following
equation: (
1− θxwN
)
λr(θ¯D) =
(
1− θxwD1
)
λr(θ¯D)− λp (29)
θ˘ =
(
wˆ − wD1
)
(wN − wD1 ) wˆ
(30)
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Therefore all content providers in the interval [θ˘, θ¯] are better of, compared
to the network neutral regime.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. The social extra term
WD − ΠD = µp
(
λ
(
r(θ¯D)− p))
(λ+ 1)
(
r(θ¯D)− p) (31)
is maximized by
pD
∗∗
=
(
1−
√
1
λ+ 1
)
r(θ¯D
∗∗
), (32)
which is identical to the price pD
∗
from equation (22) that maximizes the
ISP's profit ΠD.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. We consider each regime separately and show that the conditions with
respect to efficient investments coincide. First, we derive the conditions for
which ∂(W
N−ΠN )
∂µ
is larger/equal/smaller zero:
WN − ΠN = λ
2 (λ+ 1)
µr(θ¯D)
∂
(
WN − ΠN)
∂µ
S 0 ⇔ ∂r(θ¯
D)
∂θ¯D
θ¯D
r(θ¯D)
S −1 ⇔ εr S −1
The difference of private and efficient investment incentives under the QoS
tiering regime is:
WD − ΠD =
√
λ+ 1− 1
λ+ 1
µr(θ¯D)
∂
(
WD − ΠD)
∂µ
=
√
λ+ 1− 1
λ+ 1
(
∂r(θ¯D)
∂θ¯D
µ+ r(θ¯D)
)
S 0 ⇔
∂r(θ¯D)
∂θ¯D
θ¯D
r(θ¯D)
S −1 ⇔ εr S −1
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Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. To show that the ISP under a minimum quality standard enforcement
of wD2 = w
N has a higher incentive to invest in capacity than under network
neutrality we have to show that µMQS > µN .
wD2 = w
N
⇔ µ
MQS
µMQS − λθ¯D
1
µMQS − λβθ¯D =
1
µN − λθ¯N
⇔ µMQS = 1 + λ
1 + λ (1− β)µ
N
Since β < 1 it is easy to see, that µMQS > µN always holds true.
Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. In the QoS tiering regime with maximum quality degradation the last
CP to enter the market is located at θ
d
=
µ
(
1− pd
r
)
1+λ
(
1− pd
r
) . In contrast, the last
CP to enter under network neutrality, or equivalently under the untempered
QoS tiering regime, is located at θ
N,D
= µ
1+λ
. Obviously, for pd = 0, which
corresponds to a network neutrality regime, the indifferent content providers
coincide. However, ∀pd > 0 it easy to see that θd < θN,D for λ > 0 > r
pd−r .
This proves the first part of the proposition.
The ISP's profit under maximum quality degradation is Πd = a(pd) +
λ θ
d
(pd) pd, which is maximized by a price of pd
∗
=
r(1+λ)−
√
r(v+r(1+λ))
λ
. At
this price level, W d < WN iff v < rλ (1 + λ), which is the same condition as
for a positive equilibrium price. Thus, as long as pd > 0 (which is shown in
Proposition 10), welfare is lower under QoS tiering with maximum quality
differentiation compared to network neutrality (which again has lower welfare
than the untempered QoS tiering regime in the short-run).
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Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. At the optimal price level for Πd and ΠD, solving Πd > ΠD for v yields
v < r
(
λ
(
3 + 2λ− 2√λ+ 1
)
− 2
√
λ (λ+ 1)2
(
λ+ 2− 2√λ+ 1
))
≡ v
(33)
Furthermore, ∀λ > 0 it holds that v < rλ(1 + λ) at which pd = 0. Thus, the
ISP never engages in maximum quality degradation at pd ≤ 0, but prefers
the untempered QoS tiering regime instead.
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Figure 1: The Short-Run Effect of QoS Tiering on Content Providers' Surplus
39
congestion aggravation
congestion alleviation
Figure 2: Congestion Alleviation vs. Congestion Aggravation Effect of QoS
Tiering
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Figure 3: The Long-run Effect of QoS Tiering on Innovation and Welfare for
εr > −1.
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